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Abstract—Collaborative filtering has been widely used in 
recommendation systems to recommend items that users might 
like. However, collaborative filtering based recommendation 
systems are vulnerable to shilling attacks. Malicious users tend to 
increase or decrease the recommended frequency of target items 
by injecting fake profiles. In this paper, we propose a Kalman 
filter-based attack detection model, which statistically analyzes the 
difference between the actual rating and the predicted rating 
calculated by this model to find the potential abnormal time period.  
The Kalman filter filters out suspicious ratings based on the 
abnormal time period and identifies suspicious users based on the 
source of these ratings. The experimental results show that our 
method performs much better detection performance for the 
shilling attack than the traditional methods. 
Keywords—collaborative filtering, shilling attack, attack 
dectection, Kalman Filter 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of the Big Data age, the recommendation 
system has become an important tool for users to choose 
potential projects of interest. The recommendation system can 
make recommendations for users based on the implicit 
connection between users and items. However, this system is 
relatively vulnerable to malicious users. The attacker 
deliberately inserts attack profiles into the recommender system 
to bias the predicted rating of a specific item. As a result, this 
item can be recommended to the influenced users more or less 
frequently. For example, if a user likes to watch comedy films 
and doesn't like to watch horror movies, there should be no 
horror movies in his recommendation list. After the attack, his 
recommendation list showed horror movies that he did not like. 
This user is called the influenced user, and this kind of attack is 
called “profile injection attack” or “shilling attack”. 
In order to prevent shilling attacks, researchers tried to use 
some algorithms to detect attackers. The main challenge is how 
to detect attack profiles accurately and efficiently. The existing 
detection methods mainly use some features and models to 
separate suspicious users from the normal users. Specifically, 
some methods only consider the user’s rating of the item when 
finding attacker, and others consider more factors, such as time 
and user group. Although effective, the existing methods still 
have some limitations. Most of the detection algorithms are from 
the user's point of view, rarely from the perspective of the item, 
and the recall is poor. 
According to the issues mentioned above, we explore a novel 
model for attack detection. We assume that an anomaly 
condition will occur when an attack occurs. In the case of 
sufficient data, the genuine user's rating behavior is basically 
stable. However, the attack profile injected by an attacker is 
usually done centrally in a certain period of time. Based on the 
hypothesis, we try to seek a time-related model to detect the 
unusual behavior and determine the attack profiles. 
In this paper, we propose a novel Kalman filter model for 
detecting shilling attacks. In order to achieve the effect of 
detection, the main challenge is finding the attack profiles. 
According to the above analysis of the attack behavior, we use 
the Kalman filter's predicted value to compare with the actual 
value to calculate the deviation value. We define two kinds of 
deviation values and then determine the suspicious time period 
according to the abnormal condition of the deviation. Then the 
attack profiles are found from the suspicious time period. We 
compared the proposed Kalman filter with some existing 
methods. The experimental results show that our method 
performs much better detection performance for the shilling 
attack than the traditional methods. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we 
briefly introduce the related work. In Section III, we introduce 
some preliminaries, including attack profiles, models, etc. In 
Section IV, we describe our detection method in detail. In 
Section V, the results of the experiment are reported and 
analyzed. In the last section, we make a summary of the paper 
and prospect the direction of future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Collaborative filtering is a popular recommendation 
algorithm which is very susceptible to shilling attacks. The 
attacker falsifies the user profile and make the fake users become 
close neighbors of genuine users as more as possible. Since 
collaborative filtering is recommended based on the interests of 
neighbors, the attacker can influence the system's 
recommendation results and increase or decrease the 
recommended frequency of the target object. There are already 
many researches on the detection methods of the shilling attacks 
in CFRS. Chirita et al. [1] proposed the RDMA attribute, which 
is the earliest defined attribute used to characterize the 
difference in user’s rating vector. Then develop an algorithm to 
calculate the probability of a user becoming a shilling attacker 
using RDMA and average similarity metrics. Burke et al. [2] 
present a number of detection features which are extracted from 
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user profiles to classify users. They show that classifiers built 
using these features can detect attacks well and improve the 
stability of a recommender. Then, they utilize KNN model to 
complete the classification. Williams et al. [3] also extracted 
some features from user profiles. But they suffered 
misclassification and low precision. In addition, they tried the 
time interval detection scheme and present an empirical 
evaluation of the anomaly detection methods which can be quite 
successful in identifying items under attack and time periods in 
which attacks take place. But its robustness needs to be 
improved. Mehta et al. [4] provided an in-depth analysis of 
shilling profiles and put forward two unsupervised algorithms 
based on PLSA soft clustering and PSA variable selection. The 
algorithm has better detection performance, but it needs to know 
the size of the attack in advance, and the utility is not high. Peng 
et al. [5] proposed the “interest kurtosis coefficient” according 
to the concentration of interest of users, and used unsupervised 
detection methods to select effective detection indicators for 
different types of attack attacks, and then designed an 
unsupervised detection algorithm based on feature subsets. 
Zhang et al. [6] proposed a novel graph-based unsupervised 
learning detection algorithm, which transforms the problem of 
detecting attacks into the problem of searching for the largest 
subgraph. It is difficult for the algorithm to choose a suitable 
threshold and the performance is not good when the fill size is 
small. Wu et al. [7] proposed a semi-supervised detection 
algorithm, which combines the naive Bayesian classifiers and 
augmented expectation maximization base on several selected 
metrics. The algorithm is time consuming, low recall rate, and 
narrow applicable breadth. Lv et al. [8] proposed a detection 
method based on SVM and KNN algorithm, which can achieve 
good detection results when the mark data is small, but the 
accuracy and recall rate are relatively low when the fill size is 
small. Gao et al. [9] analyzed two common features and defined 
four types of items, then proposed a time intervals detection 
approach. They have achieved good results on four types of 
items, but the practicality is low. Yang et al. [10] find a mapping 
model between rating behavior and item distribution. They use 
8 item attributes and 12 rating attributes to construct a 
corresponding relationship between ratings and items. Then use 
these presented features to construct a mapping model for 
detecting shilling attacks. The detection results demonstrate the 
outperformance of the proposed method, but cannot reach a full 
level when the attack size is small. Bhebe et al. [11] propose a 
combiner strategy that combines multiple classifiers in an effort 
to detect shilling attacks. The proposed Meta-Learning classifier 
have a nice detection performance, but also has a low recall rate 
at low attack sizes. Zhou et al. [12] propose a detection 
algorithm based on SVM and target item analysis method. The 
method has high precision but low recall. Conclusions that can 
be drawn from existing research, including the attacker usually 
rated the target project as the highest or lowest rating, and the 
injected attack files are usually injected in a short period of time. 
So, the average rating of the item will produce a significant 
deviation in a short time. If this abnormal deviation can be 
detected, then the time of the injection attack can be determined 
to determine the attack profile. 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Attack profile and attack model 
Attackers with different attack intentions will adopt different 
attack methods. Shilling attacks can be classified into two types: 
push attack and nuke attack [13]. In the push attack, the attacker 
will give target items the highest rating. Conversely, in the nuke 
attack, the attacker will give target items the lowest rating. The 
attack profile in a general attack model is shown in Table I. 
TABLE I.  THE GENERAL ATTACK PROFILE 
𝐼𝑆 𝐼𝐹 𝐼∅  
𝑖1
𝑆 … 𝑖𝑘
𝑆 𝑖1
𝐹 … 𝑖𝑘
𝐹 𝑖1
∅ … 𝑖𝑘
∅ 𝑖𝑡 
𝛿(𝑖1
𝑆)  𝛿(𝑖𝑘
𝑆) 𝜎(𝑖1
𝐹)  𝜎(𝑖𝑘
𝐹) null  null 𝛾(𝑖𝑡) 
 
In an attack profile, 𝐼𝑆 represents the set of selected items. It 
is determined by function 𝛿 . For some types of attacks, the 
selected item is not used. 𝐼𝐹  represents a collection of filler 
items which are randomly selected by the attacker is determined 
by function 𝜎 . 𝐼∅  represents the unrated items which are not 
rated by the attackers. In addition, 𝑖𝑡  is the target item that is 
promoted or demoted. Each attack profile has a target item. 𝑖𝑡 as 
determined by the function 𝛾  is 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥  or 𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛  depending on 
whether the attack is a push or a nuke attack. 
In a single attack, the target item 𝑖𝑡 usually rated the highest 
rating (in the push attack) or the lowest rating (in the nuke 
attack). The choice of 𝐼𝑆 and 𝐼𝐹 is determined by the different 
types of attack models. There are three most commonly used 
models: random attack, average attack, and bandwagon attack 
[14]. 
• In random attack, the filler items 𝐼𝐹 are randomly chosen 
from the non-target items, and the rating value of each 
item is subject to a normal distribution with a mean rating 
value of the entire data set. The selected item is not used 
in this attack. The target item 𝑖𝑡 rating for 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
• Average attack is similar to random attack. The 
difference is that the distribution of the filler item ratings 
is determined by the normal distribution of the mean 
values of the ratings of each item 𝑖. 
• In bandwagon attack, the popular items with the highest 
number of ratings are chosen as the selected items and 
rated at the highest rating value. Filler items are 
randomly selected in non-target items and are rated near 
the average of each item's rating like the average attack. 
The target items 𝑖𝑡 for all of these attacks are rated for 
the highest or lowest rating (depending on whether it is a 
push attack or a nuke attack). 
B. Kalman Filter 
The Kalman filter algorithm estimates the value of the 
unknown variable for the next time period by analyzing the 
observed data over time. It can predict the next state based on 
the previous state (Assume that the input measured value and 
measurement noise are both normally distributed). Kalman filter 
can be represented by the following two equations. 
𝑥𝑛𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡𝑥𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡    (1) 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡𝑥𝑛𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡   (2) 
Equation (1) is called state equation and indicates the 
internal state of this system. 𝑥𝑛𝑡  represents the state vector of 
time 𝑡  with a noise 𝑤𝑡 , and 𝑤𝑡  is a normal distribution, 
𝑤𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝑄𝑡). 𝑄𝑡 is a covariance matrix. 𝑥𝑛𝑡−1, the state vector 
of time (𝑡 − 1), is the vector of the previous state of 𝑥𝑛𝑡  and 𝐹𝑡 
represents a matrix of time conversion of the system. Equation 
(2) is called observation equation. It can output the observation 
value 𝑧𝑡  according to the system state. 𝑧𝑡  is an observation 
vector with noise 𝑣𝑡, which is an observation noise vector that 
conforms to the normal distribution 𝑣𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝑅𝑡) . 𝑅𝑡  is a 
covariance matrix. Then, 𝐻𝑡  is the mapping from the state vector 
to the observation vector. 
Kalman filter has two steps: the prediction step and the 
update step. In the prediction step, it estimates the state at time 
𝑡 according to the state at time (𝑡 − 1). Then in the update step, 
it estimates the state of a more accurate t-time state based on the 
observed value at time 𝑡. The two steps process are as follow. 
Prediction step: 
?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡−1 = 𝐹𝑡?̂?𝑛𝑡−1|𝑡−1   (3) 
𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1 = 𝐹𝑡𝑃𝑡−1|𝑡−1𝐹𝑡
𝑇 + 𝑄𝑡   (4) 
Update step: 
𝐾𝑔𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1𝐻𝑡
𝑇
𝐻𝑡𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1𝐻𝑡
𝑇+𝑅𝑡
   (5) 
?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡 = ?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡−1 + 𝐾𝑔𝑡(𝑧𝑡 − 𝐻𝑡?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡−1) (6) 
𝑃𝑡|𝑡 = (𝐼 − 𝐾𝑔𝑡𝐻𝑡)𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1  (7) 
𝐾𝑔𝑡  represents Kalman gain. ?̂?𝑛𝑡−1|𝑡−1  and 𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1  are the 
value of them at time (𝑡 − 1) . ?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡−1  and 𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1  are the 
predicted value they get in the prediction step. Then, after the 
correction of the update step, the correction values ?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡|𝑡 
are obtained. 
An application example of Kalman filtering in the 
recommendation system is proposed in [15]. They use the model 
to predict user preference vectors according to user features. 
Then, generate the recommendation list. They denote 𝐹𝑡 and 𝐻𝑡  
as unit vectors 𝐼. Noise as a standard normal distribution. The 
two-step formula is update to: 
?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡−1 = ?̂?𝑛𝑡−1|𝑡−1    (8) 
𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1 = 𝑃𝑡−1|𝑡−1 + 𝐼   (9) 
  𝐾𝑔𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1+𝐼
   (10) 
  ?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡 = ?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡−1 + 𝐾𝑔𝑡(𝑧𝑡 − ?̂?𝑛𝑡|𝑡−1) (11) 
  𝑃𝑡|𝑡 = (𝐼 − 𝐾𝑔𝑡)𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1  (12) 
We improved on this model and further transformed this 
model with the characteristics of the shilling attack. 
C. Confidence interval estimate 
Confidence interval estimation is based on the central limit 
theorem which shows that the distribution of sample mean 
becomes more standardized as the sample size increases. So, if 
we have a large enough sample, we can use a normal distribution 
to describe the sample mean from any group, even a non-normal 
population [16]. The confidence interval or interval estimation 
is based on the point estimate and the sampling standard error, 
and the interval containing the parameter to be estimated is 
established according to the given probability value. The given 
probability value is called the confidence or confidence level. 
For example, a 95% confidence interval indicates that 95% of 
the data in a given data will fall within this interval. The two 
values delineating the confidence interval are called the lower 
confidence limit and the upper confidence limit. 
Suppose we have some ratings 𝑥1, 𝑥2 … 𝑥k. The purpose of 
interval estimation is to find two statistics 𝑦1, 𝑦2, so that (𝑦1, 𝑦2) 
can cover these samples as much as possible. 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 can be 
calculated by the following formula. 
𝑦1 = ?̅? − 𝜎𝑍𝛼   (13) 
𝑦2 = ?̅? + 𝜎𝑍𝛼   (14) 
Where ?̅? and 𝜎 is the mean and standard deviation of these 
ratings. 𝑍𝛼  is the z-value at the confidence level (1 − 𝛼). For 
example, when the confidence level is 95%, the value of 𝑍 is 
1.96. 
D. Item classification 
In order to target the characteristics of different items, in [9], 
they are classified into four categories according to the z-score 
of the items and the average number of ratings, fad item, fashion 
item, style item and scallop item. Z-score is calculated from the 
life cycle of each item. The life cycle represents the difference 
between the start time 𝑡𝑆  and the end time 𝑡𝐸  of a time span. 
Here is the formula for z-score: 
z − score(𝑥) =
𝑥−?̅?
𝜎𝐴
   (15) 
Where x is a life cycle of an item; ?̅? and 𝜎𝐴 are the mean and 
standard deviation of the life cycle of all these items, 
respectively. The specific division rules of the items are shown 
in Table II. 
TABLE II.  ITEM DIVISION RULE 
Category z-score (z) Number of ratings (n) 
Fad item 𝑧 < 0 𝑛 ≤ ?̅? 
Fashion item 𝑧 < 0 𝑛 > ?̅? 
Style item 𝑧 ≥ 0 𝑛 ≤ ?̅? 
Scallop item 𝑧 ≥ 0 𝑛 > ?̅? 
 
IV. OUR APPROACH 
A. Problem Analysis 
We see the shilling attack as an anomaly detection problem, 
then we need to find the exception. It is mentioned in [16] that 
the normal behavior of the recommendation system can be 
characterized by a series of observations over time. In other 
words, the rating in the normal recommendation system is 
regular. When an abnormality occurs, the regular rating will be 
disturbed. The biggest challenge we face is to find the potential 
unusual time period when the normal ratings became abnormal. 
Then we propose a detection algorithm based on Kalman filter 
model for the characteristics that the attack profiles are injected 
in a short time. 
B.  Detection process 
The process of detection is as shown in Figure 1. 
The detection process is divided into four phases, pre-
processing phase, training phase, test phase and post-processing 
phase. 
In the training phase, our goal is to get the threshold for 
detection. First, the training set extracted from the original data 
set is processed using our proposed model, which is described 
in the C subsection of our approach. Predicted values are 
generated during each step of the model. Then, the deviation is 
calculated from the comparison of the predicted value with the 
actual value. The section on deviations is described in the D 
subsection of our approach. The deviations produced at each 
step of the model are then counted together as a training set for 
the deviation. Interval estimation of these deviations produces a 
threshold. The choice of threshold is described in the E 
subsection of our approach. 
In the test phase, our goal is to get the time period in which 
the anomaly rating occurs. We add part of the data from the 
original set to the attack profile as a test set, and generate the 
deviation test set after the same processing as the training set. 
Then, the deviation test set is screened according to the threshold 
obtained in the training step to obtain a suspicious rating set. The 
screening method is described in the D subsection of our 
approach. Finally, the suspicious rating set is post-processed to 
obtain the detection result. The post-processing process is 
described in the F subsection of our approach. 
C. Detection model  
In this paper, we propose a Rating Detection Adapted 
Kalman Filter model (RDAKF). We have made some 
improvements to the traditional Kalman filter model.  
Prediction step: 
?̂? =
𝑥(𝑛𝐴+𝑛𝑃)
𝑛𝐴
    (16) 
?̂? = 𝑃 + 𝑞    (17) 
In the prediction step, first, we get the preliminary prediction 
value of rating sum x (the sum of the values of all ratings up to 
this state) and the model’s standard deviation P. Then, 𝑛𝐴 
represents the total number of ratings that have been calculated 
before the start of this condition. 𝑛𝑃 represents the total number 
of ratings in the current time block. q represents the standard 
deviation of model error. Here, [(𝑛𝐴 + 𝑛𝑃)/𝑛𝑃] is equivalent to 
𝐹𝑡 in (1). 
Update step: 
𝐾𝑔 =
?̂?
?̂?+𝑟
    (18) 
𝑥+ = ?̂? + 𝐾𝑔(𝑧 − ?̂?)   (19) 
𝑃+ = (1 − 𝐾𝑔)?̂?   (20) 
𝑛𝐴 = 𝑛𝐴 + 𝑛𝑃    (21) 
In the update step, x and P and preliminary prediction values 
?̂? and ?̂? are further processed to obtain more accurate prediction 
values 𝑥+  and 𝑃+  as output prediction results. In (18), Kg 
represents Kalman gain and r represents the standard deviation 
of measurement error. In (19), z is the sum of the values of all 
ratings within the current time block (observation value). 
Equation (21) is to update the value of 𝑛𝐴. 
In [15], they assume that user preferences do not change due 
to purchase actions, treating 𝐹𝑡 and 𝐻𝑡  in (1) and (2) as I (a unit 
vector), and taking into account the shift in user preferences, 𝑤𝑡  
and 𝑣𝑡  in (1) and (2) are regarded as the standard normal 
distribution 𝑁~(0, 𝐼). So here, we assume that q and r in (17) 
and (18) are 1. 
D. Deviation scheme 
A recommendation system is basically stable when the 
amount of data is large enough. The deviation of the data is kept 
within a certain range. First, we declare the meaning of the 
deviation mentioned in this article here. The deviation 
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Fig. 1. The process of detection model 
mentioned in this paper refers to the difference between the 
value predicted by the model and the actual value in the data set. 
The key point in judging anomalies is to determine whether 
the deviation is abnormal. So, we propose two deviations. 
The total deviation: 
𝑣 = 𝑦 − ?̂? 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑧  (22) 
The average deviation: 
 𝑣𝐴 = 𝑣/𝑛𝑃   (23) 
y in the (22) represents the sum of the results of the previous 
step and the observed data of this step. In (23), 𝑣𝐴  represents 
how much each rating in this step deviates from this step. 
With these two parameters, we can determine which 
deviations are abnormal. There are four possible situations. 
• Both 𝑣 and 𝑣𝐴 are normal, indicating that the system has 
not been attacked at this time. 
• 𝑣 is normal but 𝑣𝐴 is abnormal, that is, the total deviation 
is normal and the average deviation is abnormal. In this 
case, it is possible that the rating data is small (the total 
deviation is normal) during this time period, and both are 
extreme rating values (average deviation abnormality). 
This situation is normal and cannot be judged as 
abnormal. 
• 𝑣 is abnormal and 𝑣𝐴 is normal. The average deviation at 
this moment is normal and the total deviation is abnormal. 
This phenomenon occurs at the time of the rating set, the 
number of ratings is large (the total deviation is 
abnormal), and both are normal rating (average deviation 
is normal). 
• Both 𝑣 and 𝑣𝐴 are abnormal. There are many ratings and 
extreme ratings, and we believe that this is the time of 
attack. 
In summary, when both 𝑣  and 𝑣𝐴  are abnormal, it is 
determined that the system is under attack. 
E. Threshold selection 
In order to judge whether the deviation exceeds the standard, 
it is necessary to set a threshold. To this end, we combine the 
interval estimation knowledge in the C subsection of Section III 
to select a reasonable threshold. 
We treat each deviation as a sample of data. Confidence 
interval estimates for individual samples were performed on 
these samples. Choose a suitable confidence level to get a 
confidence upper bound. And use this upper bound as the critical 
value, which is the threshold, as the basis for judging the 
abnormality. 
Two thresholds are needed to determine the anomaly of two 
deviations, and these two thresholds need to be trained from the 
training set. Two upper bounds of confidence intervals 𝜂 and 𝜂𝐴 
are obtained as thresholds. If 𝑣 > 𝜂 and 𝑣𝐴 > η𝐴, it is regarded 
as an abnormal point. 
F. Post-processing 
The detection effect of the model can only be locked to the 
time period during which the shilling attack occurs, and the 
ratings within the time period need to be further filtered. When 
we get a series of ratings for a suspicious time period, we need 
to remove the ratings that are not extreme ratings (if it is a push 
attack, the rating that is not the highest rating is removed, and if 
it is a nuke attack, the non-minimum rating is removed). For a 
shilling attack, if attacker do not use extreme rating to attack the 
system, the effect of the attack will not easy to achieve the ideal 
situation of the attacker. Then find users who rated these 
extreme ratings and convert the suspicious rating set into a 
suspicious user set as the final detection result. 
V. EXPERIMENTS 
A. Experiment setup 
In the experiment, we use the 100K Movielens dataset, 
which contains 100,000 ratings from 943 users and 1682 items, 
records a total of 215 days of data from September 20, 1997 to 
April 23, 1998. Each user in this dataset rates at least 20 movies. 
The rating ranges from 1 to 5. We treat all the data in the original 
data set as the data evaluated by genuine users and divide this 
data into parts every four days, for a total of 54 parts. We used 
100 items including 5328 deviations as training set for training. 
According to the proportion of the item types, 12 of them are fad 
items, 6 of them are fashion items, 32 of them are style items, 
and 50 of them are scallop items. Total deviation selects 99% 
confidence and average deviation selects 90% confidence. 
This experiment is all about push attack. We select 5 projects 
as target profiles. Insert different scales of attack size with filler 
size 5%, and make them the same size as the genuine users. For 
random attacks and average attacks, we generate ratings from 
𝑁~(?̅?, 𝜎2) and 𝑁~(𝑟?̅?, 𝜎?̅?
2). In the bandwagon attack, we select 
movie 50 as the selected item and rate it 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 5. 
We tested our method on three attacks and then compared it 
with KNN, Bayes[11] and SVM[12] algorithms. KNN is a 
traditional classification algorithm. It is the grouping of the k 
most similar users. Bayesian detection algorithm mentioned in 
[11] use the combiner strategy that combines multiple classifiers 
in an effort to detect shilling attacks. The SVM algorithm in [12] 
combines target item analysis method on the basis of the SVM 
model to improve the detection performance. 
B. Evaluation Metrics 
To measure the performance of the detection algorithm, we 
use two metrics for precision and recall. 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
            𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
 (24) 
Precision reflects the proportion of a category of targets 
detected by the detector that really belong to that category. 
Where TP is the number of attack profiles detected correctly, FP 
is the number of misclassified genuine profiles into attack 
profiles. 
Recall reflects the true number of categories in a category of 
targets detected by the detector. FN is the number of attack 
profiles misclassified into genuine profiles. 
C. Experimental Results and Discussion 
In this section, we test the performance of our detection 
algorithm. First, we test the performance of our algorithm under 
different attack models. Then, we test the impact of different 
confidence levels on detection performance. Finally, we perform 
performance comparisons with the other three algorithms. 
1) Performance of Different Attack Models 
We use our algorithm to test its precision and recall in 
dealing with random attack, average attack and bandwagon 
attack. The filler size is set to 5%. 
Figure 2 shows the precision of our approach under different 
attack sizes. It can be seen that as the size of the attack increases, 
the precision of the detection algorithm is increased and the 
precision remains above 0.8. However, compared to the other 
two attacks, the algorithm has a poor effect on the low attack 
size of bandwagon attack. It can be seen that our algorithm has 
more misclassification in bandwagon attack. Bandwagon attack 
contains selected item, which is not included in the other two 
types of attacks. From the experiment result, we can conclude 
that the selected item has a certain impact on the detection 
performance of our algorithm. 
 
Fig. 2. Precision of different attack models when the attack size varies and 
filler size is 5% 
Then, Figure 3 is the recall of our method under different 
attack sizes. Our algorithm has the best detection rate for 
average attack, and it is acceptable for random attack, and the 
same problem with precision is not effective for bandwagon 
attack. It can be seen that the selected item also has an impact on 
the recall. 
 
Fig. 3. Recall of different attack models when the attack size varies and filler 
size is 5% 
2) Impact of Confidence Levels 
The choice of confidence level will affect the precision and 
recall. If the confidence level is high, then the range it accepts 
will expand. It means that a larger deviation can be accepted. 
The deviation caused by some attacks may not be detected, that 
is, the recall is reduced. However, due to the increase in 
acceptability, the probability of a normal deviation being 
misjudged is reduced, that is, the precision is improved. 
Conversely, if the confidence level is low, the recall will 
increase and the precision will decrease. So we compare the 
impact of different confidence level selections on performance 
to choose an appropriate one. 
Figure 4 shows the detection effect of the confidence levels 
for the different total deviations when the confidence level of the 
average deviation is 90%. It can be seen that the higher the 
confidence level of the total deviation, the higher the accuracy 
when the confidence level of the average deviation is fixed. 
 
Fig. 4. The effect of different confidence levels of total deviation on detection 
Figure 5 and 6 show the detection effect of the confidence 
level of the total deviation and the confidence level of the 
different average deviations. Figure 5 shows the average attack 
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and Figure 6 shows the bandwagon attack. In average attack, 90% 
confidence level and 85% confidence level are comparable, 
while 95% confidence level is less effective. In bandwagon 
attack, 95% confidence level highest, 90% second, 85% worst. 
 
Fig. 5. The effect of different confidence levels of average deviation on 
detection (average attack) 
 
Fig. 6. The effect of different confidence levels of average deviation on 
detection (bandwagon attack) 
Figure 7 is the recall rate of the five combinations mentioned 
above. 
Based on the above comparison, for the confidence level of 
the total deviation, the higher the confidence level, the higher 
the precision. The recall is almost the same, so we choose a 99% 
confidence level. 
For the confidence level of the average deviation, both the 
85% and 95% confidence levels have significant disadvantages 
under certain circumstances. So we choose a more balanced 90% 
confidence level. 
 
Fig. 7. The recall of different confidence levels (bandwagon attack) 
3) Comparison of detection performance 
We compared our approach with three algorithms. As shown 
in Figures 8, in terms of the precision of the average attack, our 
method is slightly better than the improved SVM algorithm 
(slightly less than it in the case of low attack size) and is 
significantly better than the other two algorithms. Bayes 
algorithm is not suitable for detection on low attack size. 
 
Fig. 8. Precision of different detection algorithms on average attack with a 
filler size of 5% 
The precision contrast in the bandwagon attack is shown in 
the Figure 9, the precision of other algorithms does not change 
much compared to it in the average attack, and the precision of 
our algorithm has a certain decline due to the influence of the 
selected item. 
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
P
re
ci
si
o
n
Attack Size
Tol 99% Avg 90%
Tol 99% Avg 85%
Tol 99% Avg 95%
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
P
re
ci
si
o
n
Attack Size
Tol 99% Avg 90%
Tol 99% Avg 85%
Tol 99% Avg 95%
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0 5 1 0 15 20
R
ca
ll
Number of Attack Profile
Tol 95% Avg 90%
Tol 90% Avg 90%
Tol 99% Avg 90%
Tol 99% Avg 85%
Tol 99% Avg 95%
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
P
re
ci
si
o
n
Attack Size
Our Approach
KNN
Bayes
Improved SVM
 Fig. 9. Precision of different detection algorithms on bandwagon attack with 
a filler size of 5% 
Figure 10 is the recall comparison of the three algorithms in 
the average attack. Our algorithm shows the best performance. 
The improved SVM algorithm has reached a very high precision 
level due to the addition of the target item analysis strategy. 
However, this strategy is mainly to reduce the situation that 
genuine users are classified as attack users. Therefore, its recall 
is limited to the SVM model itself does not reach a higher level. 
The combiner strategy used in the Bayes detection algorithm is 
also for misclassification. So, its recall is also based on the 
performance of the Bayesian model itself. The KNN algorithm 
responds to the assumption that the attacker has a high similarity, 
and can clearly distinguish between the genuine user and the 
attack user, but for those attack users whose attack effect is not 
obvious, there is no good detection effect (low recall). 
 
Fig. 10. Recall of different detection algorithms on average attacks with a filler 
size of 5% 
Our method is different from other algorithms in terms of 
user vectors, but detects the true and false of the rating itself. It 
is highly sensitive to abnormal conditions, which is reflected in 
the high recall. Since it is targeted at rating data, the likelihood 
of misclassification increases when the rating is mapped to the 
user, that is, the precision is lower in some cases. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we propose an improved Kalman filter model 
RDAKF. It calculates the deviation between the predicted value 
and the actual value, and measures the abnormal rating data 
according to the confidence interval estimation. The experiment 
uses the dataset of Movielens to analyze the performance of our 
approach under different attack models. Then, we compare our 
algorithm with other algorithms. The experimental results show 
that our algorithm has a good effect in detecting the abnormal 
ratings, but it is not effective for some attack models with 
selected items. 
In the future work, we will focus on the impact of selected 
items and consider more types of attacks. Combine some 
implicit features with more datasets to come up with a better 
solution. 
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